


# Accessing food insecurity in contemporary global conflicts: what role could the Atlantic Basin play?

Leonardo Paz Neves

SECURITY/  
INEQUALITY



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# **Accessing food insecurity in contemporary global conflicts: what role could the Atlantic Basin play?**

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## Abstract

This paper explores aspects of food insecurity, such as price hikes and food shortages, and their relations with political unrest and violent conflicts. It focuses on analysing the literature that studies the binomial food insecurity-violent conflict to establish a standpoint on recent events and their impact on food security. The core argument of the article is that fostering international technical cooperation for development and focusing on food production could generate significant positive impacts towards food insecurity mitigation and, thus, its function as a conflict catalyst. The argument goes further in recognising that the Atlantic Basin countries could play a key role in countering such threats by sharing their expertise in cooperation for development and tropical agriculture. In addition, strategic and policy recommendations for addressing these challenges should be discussed.

**Keywords:** Food Insecurity; Violent Conflicts; Cooperation for Development.

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## About the author

**Leonardo Paz Neves** is Senior Reseacher at the International Intelligence Unit of Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV IIU), and Associate Professor at Ibmec College.

**Address:** Treze de Maio Av., 23 / Room 1115 - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
leonardo.neves@fgv.br

# Reasoning

According to FAO (2022), we “are under threat by the triple crises of climate, conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic”; therefore, it is of paramount importance not only to have a better understanding of this ‘perfect storm’, but also to develop policy solutions to address these challenges and mitigate their effects.

Tackling climate change is probably one of the most complex global challenges of our time. It demands unprecedented international cooperation and political goodwill from states, not to mention an extraordinary commitment and political finesse from the state’s leadership to deal with domestic interests from their economic elites.

Conflicts are a challenge of a different nature. Unlike climate change, they are local, even though they might (and generally do) spill over and affect their regions or even the globe. Even so, providing suggestions to tackle the variety of conflicts with their multiple root causes and unique features would fall into a dangerous trap of oversimplification and generalisation; there is no one-size-fits-all solution for violent conflicts. Thus, this piece will not focus on conflicts.

Food Security, on the other hand, is a matter of grave importance that will not be easily solved, especially because, as mentioned, several conflicts tend to impact the countries’ food security in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, some policy solutions have a more technical profile and might demand fewer political nuances to gain traction. From a more technical perspective, tackling hunger and improving food security is possibly the lowest-hanging fruit and might offer us the ability to diminish their impact on future conflicts.

The binomial hunger-conflict has been a long and nearly symbiotic relationship throughout history. They can feed themselves into a vicious cycle reinforcing each other, not only magnifying their impact but also lingering their consequences. They are not often their primary causes. Conflict, for instance, especially a civil conflict, generally is preceded by political instability fuelled by power disputes. The US Political Instability Task Force has identified that the key variable to detect the likelihood of conflict in a country is the vulnerability of its political system and the disenfranchisement of certain key domestic groups. Regarding hunger, a host of studies and international agencies’ reports have identified that climate change is presently the prime driver of food insecurity (Raleigh, 2015; EIU, 2021; FAO, 2022; and Kang, 2023).

Despite the fact that, from a historical standpoint, hunger has declined over the last few decades (FAO, 2018), hundreds of millions of people continue to suffer from serious and severe food insecurity. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has interrupted the positive trend. According to “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World” report (2022), 828 million people are currently affected by hunger, 150 million more than in 2019.

Whether or not this is a coincidence, the world is currently facing the highest number of conflicts since World War II. According to Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed, roughly two billion people live presently under the threat of violent conflicts<sup>1</sup>.

As stated, the increasing occurrence of these two elements worries since there is a significant correlation between the two. For instance, FAO (2017) reported that all nineteen countries under their radar for being in a protracted food crisis were also in a conflict. Moreover, besides the already known and daunting effects of the binomial hunger-conflict, we also should note the aggravating effects of the current war in Ukraine. The involvement of two agricultural and inputs superpowers should have “multiple implications for global agricultural markets through the channels of trade, production and prices” (FAO, 2022), which could definitively aggravate the current state of food security in many countries and regions.

This article was developed under a few key assumptions. Given that each country is unique, whether in terms of climate (and subsequent extreme weather events), societal composition (ethnic, religious, organisations, etc.), agricultural practices, or government and institutional architecture, the first challenge is to focus on general policy solutions or directions that can be adapted for each context.

Second, a given state’s coherence and strength significantly impact conflicts and food security. That is, state weakness more than often leads to political division and/or bad policies. Addressing several institutional hurdles, even if only on a technical level, could generate significant positive gains.

Food security has different effects on individual, local and national levels. Recommendations must not only understand the nuances of each level but also be paramount to craft solutions customised for each level. That also implies that tackling food insecurity in conflict zones is completely different from dealing with it in scenarios where the violence has not yet broken out. Hunger is not only a tactic but also a resource of power. Thus, technical solutions will have less effect, especially when it could become an ‘item’ of interest and ambition from the warring parties, escalating the conflict.

Lastly, food prices seem to have a relationship with the increased tensions within

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1. Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed’s speech at the Security Council, January 2023. Available at: <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15184.doc.html>

countries, but the subject has many nuances. Although global prices matter, local pricing could have different impacts since local problems could affect different countries, especially food-importing and food-exporting countries. Moreover, price spikes also seem to have a dissimilar effect on price volatility.

Given the complexity of violent conflicts and the technical aspects of food security, this article begins by dealing with concepts. The second section will unveil the entangled relationship between food security and conflict, pointing out the order of precedence: conflicts impacting hunger versus hunger impacting conflict. The third section will address the multifaceted causal relationship between food insecurity and conflicts. The aim here is to highlight the objective ways in which food insecurity can impact or lead to conflicts. Lastly, we will focus on policy solutions or, better yet, technical best practices that could demand less goodwill from governments to enhance food security resilience in vulnerable countries.

## 2 Organising the Concepts

Establishing a relationship between food insecurity and conflict is not a daunting task. Numerous studies (some identified in this paper) have mapped several circumstances in which hunger and other food insecurity-related conditions have contributed to conflicts. Even so, from an academic and policy perspective, more is needed than merely identifying this relationship. To fully understand the case in analysis and design effective policies to counter their negative impacts, situations should be better characterised with attention to their many nuances.

For that matter, it is important to ‘disaggregate’ some concepts. This disaggregation and conceptualisation are critical to getting a grasp of the cases in the study. For instance, **conflict** is probably the most important issue that requires further disaggregation. Each type of conflict has its unique set of effects on how it will impact the food security of a given community (or city, state, region, etc.). The same is true for institutions’ role in coping with violent conflict and their part in its occurrence: different institutions respond to different types of conflict categories.

Thus, at the very least, conflicts should be divided into intrastate and interstate wars. This simple division alone is vital, as while both significantly impact the affected region’s food security, the opposite is not true. The causality between food insecurity and interstate war is considerably less noticeable. The roots of interstate wars are more generally associated with the national interest, ruling elites’ objectives or resource disputes over borders, such as shared river basins or water access disputes. The Iran-Afghanistan water dispute could serve as an example.<sup>2</sup>

Conversely, intrastate conflicts are more commonly rooted in elements linked to state fragility. Intrastate conflicts can have different proportions, affecting the local population differently. They may represent a large conflict, as with the Syrian civil, which impacted the country and the whole region, or a more localised one, such as the Boko Haran attacks in northeastern Nigeria. In either case, the root causes of those conflicts are generally associated with the state’s inability to provide public goods and/or alienate a given identity group. Here, food insecurity is often one of the critical sparks that cause civil unrest and eventually more extensive uprisings. Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2008), for instance, have found that malnutrition and poor health conditions are connected to an increased likelihood of civil wars. Following the same thread, Sobek and Boehmer (2009) have pointed out that low average per

2. Source: <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/what-is-the-iran-taliban-water-conflict-all-about-8642887/>. Date of access: 06 June 2023.



capita caloric consumption increases the probability of civil conflict. They also indicate that this relationship is more robust in commodities-driven economies. The argument is that the abundance of commodities in the face of widespread hunger generally leads to grievances among the less and the most fortunate, creating a volatile environment.

Moreover, independently of the type of conflict, violence does not affect everyone equally. Even in war-torn countries, individuals are exposed to the conflict differently, given their socioeconomic standing. This **heterogeneity** is paramount for policy and decision-makers to better tailor policies and design emergency relief actions to ensure that assistance reaches those in need. Micro-level analysis of conflict situations has led researchers (Koren, 2017; Verwimp et al., 2018) to better identify the heterogeneity of food insecurity's impact on conflicts. Conflict and food scarcity jolt an impoverished widow from an ethnic or religious minority differently than a businessman from a dominant identity group. Verme and Gigliarano (2018) call for new methods, such as the Receiver Operating Characteristic curves, to optimise and better target humanitarian relief efforts to address possible distortions and mismanagement of policy and aid.

Lastly, **climate change** has become the critical variable in the food insecurity debate (not considering conflict-ridden situations). According to the United Nations, "Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperatures and weather patterns"<sup>3</sup>. Historically, these shifts were generally attributed to natural phenomena, but since the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s, human activity has been related as the key driver behind the current shifts. The visible consequences of temperature shifts caused by climate change are the increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather events that could be felt all around the globe. A large array of weather events is important for food insecurity. Changed could varying long-term impacts, affecting the ability to grow a given agricultural culture or causing desertification. As for short-term impacts, heavy rains, floods and drought are the most common weather shocks impacting agricultural activities.

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3. Accessed in: <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-climate-change>

## The Food Security-Conflict Nexus


As mentioned, accepting a mutual and reinforcing relationship between conflicts and food insecurity. Nonetheless, from an analytical perspective, it is tough to disentangle the myriad of aspects that connect these two issues and others that are often related (such as forced migrations and other humanitarian crises) and have a compounded effect.

However, the literature shows that there is an underlying problem that has a crosscutting effect in all those crises, namely state fragility-weak institutions pair (Bruck and Errico, 2019; Martin-Shields and Stojetz, 2018; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). The World Bank's WGI-Government Effectiveness Scores<sup>4</sup> data is very illustrative. First, as shown in Table 1, there is a perfect correlation between the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS&AV/T) and Government Effectiveness (GE) indicators every year from 1996 to 2021. The lower the percentile rank in (PS&AV/T), the lower their rank in GE. It is impressive that the percentile rank ranges are the same across Low, Lower Middle and Upper Middle-Income indicators.

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4. Accessed in: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

**Table 1. Comparative Analysis Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism and Government Effectiveness**




Source: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>

Along the same lines, we can draw correlations between the level of Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism (WGI indicator) and the HungerMap<sup>5</sup> developed by the World Food Program (WFP). Comparing the information between the two platforms, we can identify that eight of HungerMap's Top 12 Countries with the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption (which currently account for 29% of the global number of people with insufficient food) are in the lowest percentile rank (0-10%) of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. Three of them (Chad, Haiti and Guinea) are in the second lowest percentile rank (10-25%), with only Sierra Leone in the mid percentile rank (25-50%).

5. Accessed in: <https://static.hungermapdata.org/insight-reports/latest/global-summary.pdf>

**Figure 1. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (2021)**



Source: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>

In a similar effort, Martin-Shields and Stojetz (2018) drew comparisons between the World Bank data and the FAO dataset (both from 2017). They manage to identify that food price volatility and undernourishment have an inverse correspondence to the level of public administration quality: the weaker the state, the more price volatility and the higher prevalence of undernourished people. Moreover, once filtered countries affected by interstate conflict, seventeen reported significant food price volatility and nineteen prevalence of undernourishment.

Moreover, in tandem with the strong correlations mentioned above, it is worth mentioning that sometimes we should consider not only 'active conflicts', which means open civil or interstate wars. Especially in the context of fragile states, several factors serve as precursors of violence. Several of these factors are captured in indicators used to measure state fragility. One interesting case is the State Fragile Index from the Fund for Peace<sup>6</sup>. The indicators clustered under the Cohesion segment include **Security Apparatus**, **Factionalized Elites** and **Group Grievance**. They are important elements in

6. Accessible at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>

identifying potential conflicts and institutional crises. It is not a surprise that all Top 12 Countries with the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption, based on the WFP's HungerMap, are among the top 21 most fragile countries, according to the Fragile State Index, all of them scoring eight or higher in all three mentioned indicators.<sup>7</sup>

Arguments towards the impacts of violent conflict on the food security of a given country/ region generally target the demand side of the equation, meaning the effects of food deprivation, experimental hunger, and malnourishment on individuals and households. This perspective is understandable since those are the most visible aspects of the conflict-food insecurity dynamic. One of the most common situations is the closure or looting of shops and food markets, seizure of humanitarian aid by the warring parties, roadblocks preventing truck access from resupplying cities and refugees fleeing their homes as one of the most dramatic examples.

Nonetheless, when viewed from the supply side, conflicts (or even tensions prior to conflicts) can have significantly more complex and long-term impacts on food insecurity. Again, starting from the most visible example, hunger has been a weapon for over millennia. The destruction of crops and slaughtering (theft) of livestock by one of the warring parties can disrupt the ability of several communities to subsist.

Another short-term impact on the supply side is price volatility. Markets closed, shops looted, roadblocks, crops burnt, and cattle stolen – some of those together have a compounded effect on food availability, influencing food prices. In conflict-affect areas, the price fluctuation favours the creation of underground markets and criminal activities, further impacting food security levels.

From a long-term perspective, on the supply side, a key aspect is the impacts of conflicts (and the threat of violence) on agricultural production. Martin-Shields and Stojetz (2018) argued that despite clarifying the impacts of conflicts on food production, this phenomenon needs to be better understood and understudied with more national and local data available. Nonetheless, based on the information gathered thus far, it is possible to identify several impacts that may result in sharp production drops during conflict periods. The more significant difficulty in accessing credit and other public policies to foster production, access to land and pasture, and labour supply — as workers join the fight (voluntarily or not) or flee the region — increases criminal activities (due to the absence of government policing) robbing or destroying property, among others.

Moreover, local farmers and livestock ranchers have adopted a common strategy to cope with the emergence of tensions and conflicts eruptions. According to Justino (2009) and Rockmore (2015), when confronted with security-related uncertainty, these actors tend to eschew 'low-risk low-return coping strategies'; that is, they take steps to reduce the conflict's exposure to their production assets. These strategies

7. The Fragile State Index ranks 0 to 10, with 0 being the best score and 10 being the worst scenario. Accessible at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/>

may vary from reducing the farmland or the herd size (converting the assets into currency, which is easier to move), changing the crop's cultures, anticipating harvest or postponing the plantation, etc. These 'low-risk low-return coping strategies' provide farmers and ranchers with short-term benefits. However, they may also have long-term consequences on the stability of production and the ability to meet the food demands of a particular region.

## 4 Food Security Impacting on Organized Violence

**A**lthough this relationship between food insecurity and conflict dynamics is poorly explored and documented, some historical accounts try to draw on this causal effect. Most of these accounts highlight that the food prices issue catalyses violence, leading to more dramatic food insecurity. Several authors (Rudé, 1964 and Diamond, 2005) establish a link between food prices and uprisings, revolutions and even wars. The possibility of this connection has led most studies to cross-reference their conflict data with the FAO price index on food commodities to identify possible causal relationships.

Research on the relationship between high food price volatility and conflict has also given us hints on how they develop in specific contexts. For instance, a spike in food prices seems to raise the probability of social unrest in urban areas at first, while production disruption caused by climate shifts is more related to conflict in rural areas. (Hendrix et al., 2012).

According to Martin-Shields and Stojetz (2018), the prevailing justification for the impacts of food prices leading to conflicts is related to ‘consumer grievances’. Price increases tend to generate economic constraints within households and communities, resulting in a feeling of loss and deprivation, which generates grievances, typically directed at the state and/or elites. Despite consumer grievances are often the focus of literature (emphasis here on the word consumer), identity grievance elements, such as ethnicity, religions, and clans, could offer a richer and more comprehensive perspective as the study of identity elements has been widely examined in security and conflict analyses. Diverting from this path, some are innovating by focusing on specific internal country food price indices. This approach considers consumer patterns from the analysed unit, the identified constraint type and the affected communities (Weinberg and Bakker, 2015).

Such approaches to the food price-conflict dynamic may centre on state failure and the breakdown of internal institutions. As most arguments here go, a state’s inability to provide food security to its population (or given communities) tends to rapidly erode the government’s legitimacy (especially if this ‘inability’ is more pronounced for certain identity groups). The research from Arezki and Brueckner (2014) is interesting to illustrate this dynamic. The authors argue that, in low-income countries, there is an inverse relationship between the cohesiveness of political institutions and food prices; that is, the institution’s cohesion tends to decline as international food prices rise expressively.

Whatever the source, disruptions in food production could also be problematic. Consequently, it may impact the country's tax revenues and cause price spikes. This effect is typically more devastating in countries that export agricultural commodities and rely heavily on revenues from this sector. The government may need if high prices result in lost revenue and prevent the population from meeting their caloric needs. Add to those common problems in low and lower-middle-income countries, such as corruption, maldistribution and patronage, and we have a compounding effect in food insecurity and inflammable context for grievances.

Food production problems may also act as a catalyst for social instability. For that hypothesis, climate change has an important effect. Agriculture already has a delicate balance in the sense of its labour utilisation. While it demands intense labour during the harvest and plantation season, during the other times, the idle labour has to find other occupations. Climate change fluctuations or extreme weather events may cause significant disruptions in food production and the crops' life cycle, altering their seasons. Changes in the season balance and the consequential unexpected decrease in labour demand tend to increase the engagement from the idled workforce in what Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) call 'antisocial behaviour'. In that fashion, the decrease in agricultural output could have direct impacts on reducing the opportunity costs of engaging in antisocial behaviour, the food security from a given community, and could even generate famine, which, in its turn, tends to activate grievances that leads to social unrest and other types of violent manifestation.

These shifts in the food production chains have offered interesting data on accessing behaviour at the individual level. Evidence drawn from the research of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) shows us how armed groups organise their recruiting patterns, focusing on those whose basic needs are threatened and engaging recruits by offering them food, medicines, shelter and security. Confronted with their previous predicament, many young men/women accept the conflict's perils to address their urgent needs. Even those not directly joining the fighting have 'incentives' to support the local armed groups by providing money, goods and shelter. These incentives generally come in the form of security from the other warring parties in the conflict, from criminals and looters, whose numbers tend to rise during conflicts.



## Policy Aspects: Reacting to the Root Causes

**F**irst of all, institutions are essential. Helping build good governance is a traditional goal of international aid schemes that should be valued. However, despite the importance of values and principles, building technical capacity is vital, especially in countries with less complex educational and technical establishments.

International Cooperation for development, particularly involving several partners, is critical for building development and sharing experiences. In this context, the exchange and sharing of social technologies are the portfolio's lowest-hanging fruit. Brazil, as mentioned, has a proven track record of sharing some of its best social policy practices with other countries through South-South Cooperation and trilateral cooperation.

Fostering research and technology in the agricultural sector could be a game-changing aspect of tackling climate change-induced food insecurity. International efforts should be pooled to focus on techniques and technologies that might improve the resilience of agriculture as a whole (from water management techniques to developing heat resistance seeds).

At both extremities of the rope are Atlantic-washed nations. This area has extremely competent food producers/exporters and many countries dealing with severe food crises (many embroiled in conflicts). The region includes technological powerhouses and states that require more rudimentary agricultural practices. A comprehensive network of cooperation programs could provide a significant positive impact on food security across the regions.

Addressing food security is a daunting task, not only for the scale of the challenge but also for the complexity of the variety of situations presented in terms of the profile of food production, the level of climate impact, the intensity of violence, the presence of communal (identity) strife and, most notably, the fragility of the state and its institutions. Nonetheless, an essential set of policies could generate positive benefits in most cases. For instance, water management policies are also vital for food production. Considering that over 90% of farms in low-income countries in the Middle East and Africa rely on rainwater for their crops (Kang, 2023), irrigation systems become paramount for addressing climate shifts and altering the rainfall pattern.

That said, it is possible to identify key policies that can generate positive effects in most cases and cope with many aspects of food insecurity and food price spikes. Policymakers should focus on curbing food price increases since there is evidence

relating price spikes to social unrest and potential conflicts. Moreover, tackling the rise in food prices seems a bigger priority than price volatility, as the first has more potential to cause social unrest. At the same time, the latter is sometimes associated with decreased social tensions (Bellemare, 2015).

One of the key objectives of the policies discussed above should be to enhance the availability and accessibility of food resources. Actions in this direction would reduce prices, increase the availability of common product substitutes, and tackle malnutrition. Other policies that might help include investment in agricultural research, biotechnology adoption, engagement in trade liberalisation schemes and encouraging innovative agricultural formats in urban areas and peripheries. Food purchases and reserves organised by governments also have a key role in reducing the volatility of food prices, especially in mitigating the impact of price spikes on society. Although relatively simple to implement, food reserves demand good management and resources to keep stocks steady enough to play their role in a crisis. Budgetary constraints generally keep the stocks below reasonable levels and, thus, cannot hold the prices when needed.

However, engaging in all these policies is a considerable challenge for any low and lower-middle-income country. Adding to the equation the issue of state fragility, we are confronted with countries needing institutional expertise and/or capability to enact some of the policies abovementioned. For that matter, we advocate for more international cooperation for development in order to aid those countries. The key argument is that several policies have generated very positive outcomes that could be shared with other developing countries through bilateral, trilateral and even multilateral cooperation schemes. Several of these good practices have low complexity for implementation and could mitigate acute food insecurity in specific contexts.

Priorities in tackling food insecurity and monitoring weather patterns to prevent shocks in production disruptions include production support policies (such as the ProSavana project), early warning surveillance projects and targeted financial assistance.

The ProSavana<sup>8</sup> is a case point. Trilaterally developed by Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, the project sought to share the Brazilian expertise in tropical agriculture with Mozambicans to increase food production in the Nacala Corridor, thus transforming it into a food-producing region. One of the project's key objectives was to increase food availability in Mozambique by strengthening its agriculture, thus addressing the hunger eradication goal.

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8. Accessible at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/CooperacaoSulSul/Mocambique>

## 6 Final Considerations

**T**he relationship between food insecurity and violence is not a difficult one to identify. As mentioned before, it is easier to map the correlation between the effects of conflict on food security. It has a more significant impact and offers more data to process. Inverting the process is trickier. More research is needed to identify conflicts caused by food insecurity. Food insecurity may occur for different reasons, demanding a more comprehensive and long-term analysis and a cross-cutting investigation.

As stated, the root causes stressing food production and the effects of these events on conflicts are extraordinarily complex. Although a harsh reality, the increasing frequency of extreme weather events is a global issue, and no single country can tackle it, especially a developing one. In that sense, countries can only invest in adaptation measures to the best of their abilities. Despite not being global, conflicts have a multifaceted nature. Dealing with it implicates a different range of political solutions and addresses the interest of the parties involved, not to mention coping with eventual communal (identity) strife. State failure is a long-term problem. Most developing countries have only been independent for a few generations. Building 'stateness' requires time, political accommodation and a huge amount of political will.

While not an easy issue, food security is a field in which we may find several 'low hanging fruits' initiatives with technical nature, low political constraints and quick positive impact. International Development Cooperation could offer an interesting framework where countries could share their best practices with countries in need. The previously mentioned ProSavana project is an illustrative example that, while operational, managed to improve the potential of food production of the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique. Here, the Atlantic Basin region is well positioned to be a powerhouse in cooperation initiatives to boost food production, water management, control food prices, and mitigate food scarcity. Many countries have expertise in tropical agriculture, international funding schemes, food technology, among other areas.

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## About the Project

The Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 is a small network of six members that keep intense communication and joint activities on the Atlantic Basin. The Network also serves as a central arena for discussing globalisation and key major trends in the several Atlantic microcosms. By combining the national with the regional perspective, its research and debates take into account the different foreign interests and pressures, as well as a critical view on the possible roles and future of the European Union (EU) in the area.

It is the present link of a long chain of projects. In 2016, the project that established the first Jean Monnet Network on Atlantic Studies ([jeanmonnetnetwork.com.br](http://jeanmonnetnetwork.com.br)) sought to foster knowledge and co-operation among scholars and researchers on topics of fundamental importance for Atlantic actors in general, and for the EU, in particular. It involved a greater number of centres and universities.

Seven years later, still focussed on the original three broad thematic axes -Energy/Sustainability, Trade/Economy (International Economic Flows) and Security/Inequality-, the Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 represents a continuation and a rupture with the previous undertakings.

It intends to offer a wide, innovative and sometimes controversial view on Atlantic problems and the expectations on and scope of the EU activities relative to them. The papers in this series are a sample of its achievements.





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